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FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE

IN A CONVENTIONAL CONTEXT:
IS THERE ROOM FOR FEMINISM IN
DWORKIN'S THEORY OF
INTERPRETIVE CONCEPTS?@
By LYNNE HANSON*
This paper examines Dworkin's interpretive theory of law from a feminist
perspective, and asks whether his attempts to accommodate competing
political opinions within an interpretive community can successfully encompass
feminist concerns as well. It is argued that Dworkin repeatedly underestimates
the extent of disagreement regarding the practice of law as a whole, while his
requirements of fit, coherence and integrity impose a political agenda on the
interpreter. As a consequence, Dworkin's theory is ultimately unable to
adequately respond to a feminist critique of law, so that feminist jurisprudence
must be seen as falling outside the scope of his interpretive community.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Ronald Dworkin, one of the most prominent figures in
contemporary jurisprudence, is representative of a conventional school
of thought grounded in a strong liberal tradition. In his most recent
writings, Dworkin has attempted to accommodate the newer, more
critical directions of contemporary jurisprudence.1 Specifically, he
makes claims about the ability of the common law to accommodate a
wide range of competing political interests and various groups in society.
In this paper, I assess Dworkin's success in this endeavour in relation to
the demands of feminist jurisprudence. Some feminists argue that the
North American legal tradition, by its very nature and in the ordinary
course of operation, effects the systematic oppression of women. At
issue here is whether Dworkin's theory of an interpretive community can
adequately satisfy this kind of feminist critique of the law.
Dworkin's claim to accommodate such controversy is important
because, if true, it calls into question the necessity for any separate
feminist jurisprudence beyond the bounds of traditional legal theory. If
the interests of women are already adequately served within Dworkin's
legal theory, then the need for distinctly feminist argument evaporates.
The alternative put forward in this paper is that Dworkin's interpretive
community cannot encompass feminist concerns because the two are
premised on different assumptions regarding the extent of consensus
within society. Feminists simply do not share Dworkin's perception of a
fundamental agreement in society at some level regarding the validity of
law as a practice. As a consequence, feminist theorists have been forced
to step outside the interpretive community of law that Dworkin
describes, and have chosen instead to formulate their own radical
reconceptions of what law ought to be.
It is impossible to point to one particular theory or set of ideas
which might be said to be representative of feminist jurisprudence.
Feminist legal theory encompasses a broad range of theoretical
perspectives, from liberal theories which emphasize women's sameness
and equal entitlement in a rights-based system, 2 to postmodernist
1 R. Dworkin, "Law as Interpretation" (1982) 60 Tex. L. Rev. 527 and R. Dworkin, Law's
Empire (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1986).
2 For example, see H. Lessard, "Relationship, Particularity, and Change: Reflections on R. v.
Morgentalerand Feminist Approaches to Liberty" (1991) 36 McGill L.J. 263.
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accounts of law that deny the possibility of any objective criteria or
neutral decision making whatsoever 3 As a consequence, I have selected
two tenets of feminist jurisprudence which are common denominators in
most, if not all, feminist legal theories: that our society systematically
oppresses women through the institution of law; and that the
methodology of law operates to disguise this inherent gender bias
through its reliance on supposedly objective rules and neutral decision
making.
One of the most compelling critical accounts of the legal system's
inherent bias comes from Catharine MacKinnon, who writes about the
inevitable tendency of the law to reinforce a pattern of male -dominance
in society. 4 She puts forward an eloquent and persuasive explanation of
a legal system which systematically oppresses women by embodying a
male norm of behaviour in its laws, procedures and institutional
structures. Many of MacKinnon's ideas (sometimes identified as radical
feminism) are reiterated in the works of legal theorist Ann Scales, 5 who
writes about the ways in which legal institutions effectively exclude
women's perspectives. Together, these theories provide a good basis for
comparison with Dworkin's ideas, because they present a sweeping
radical critique of the same legal community that Dworkin looks to as a
means of accommodating such differences" of opinion. As such, the
works of Scales and MacKinnon indicate why most feminists have
chosen to step outside of the interpretive community that Dworkin
describes. These feminist authors perceive an underlying dynamic that is
so pervasive and inimical to women's interests that attempts such as
Dworkin's to accommodate critical accounts of law are not only

3 See generally, Z.R. Eisenstein, The Female Body and the Law (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1988), and LJ. Nicholson, ed., Feminism/Postmodernism(New York: Routledge,
1990). There are also many important theories of age, race, class and gender within feminist theory.
See, for example, A. Lorde, Sister Outsider (Trumansburg, N.Y.: The Crossing Press, 1984) and PJ.
Williams, TheAlchemy of Race and Rights (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1991).
4 C.A. MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified: Discourses on Life and Law (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 1987) and C.A. MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory of the State
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1989).
5 A. Scales, "The Emergence of Feminist Jurisprudence: An Essay" (1986) 95 Yale L.J. 1373
[hereinafter "The Emergence of Feminist Jurisprudence"] and A. Scales, "Militarism, Male
Dominance and Law: Feminist Jurisprudence as Oxymoron?" (1989) 12 Harv. Women's Li. 25.
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ultimately futile, but may also create a dangerous6 sense of security
regarding the law's ability to serve women's interests.
The purpose of this paper then, is to examine Dworkin's thesis of
the interpretive community from a feminist perspective, in an effort to
determine the ways in which these two theoretical perspectives diverge.
This exercise is intended to indicate some points of departure of feminist
jurisprudence from conventional legal thought, and also seeks to explain
the disagreement which arises about whether Dworkin's theory is
capable of accommodating feminist concerns. It is hoped that this
discussion of the points of conflict between Dworkin's account of the law
and feminist concerns about gender oppression will reveal the
fundamental disjunction between the two. My thesis is that Dworkin's
theory of "fit" in an interpretive community is simply incapable of
representing the sweeping concerns of feminist jurisprudence, as
Dworkin fails to grasp the magnitude and implications of a feminist
critique of law.
II. DWORKIN'S INTERPRETIVE CONCEPTS
Dworkin develops his theory around the existence of an
interpretive community wherein a practice takes on a significant
meaning for society. In this community, an "interpretive attitude" may
be discerned which assumes that this practice has a value: "that it serves
some interest or purpose or enforces some principle-in short, that it
has some point-that can be stated independently of just describing the
rules that make up the practice."'7 This interpretive attitude also
includes the assumption that the requirements of the practice will
change insofar as it is "sensitive to its point.''8 In other words, certain
practices may be distinguished by the special meaning they hold for a
society. This meaning is not self-evident but must be constantly
interpreted, and it is consequently changing all the time in light of those
interpretations: "People now try to impose meaning on the institution

6 For more recent discussions of feminism and law, see M.A. Fineman & N.S. Thomadsen,
eds,At the BoundariesofLaw: Feminism and Legal Theory (New York: Routledge, 1991).
7Law's Empire, supra, note 1 at 47.

8 jbid
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-to see it9in its best light-and then to restructure it in the light of that
meaning."
Dworkin depicts the decision-making process in law as an
interpretive practice wherein judges as interpreters construct the objects
of interpretation in accordance with their own views of the law.
"Roughly, constructive interpretation is a matter of imposing purpose on
an object or practice in order to make of it the best possible example of
the form or genre to which it is taken to belong." 10 One important
element of this depiction is that the choice of purpose resides with the
interpreter; it is not dictated by the text or elicited from the author's
intention. This interpretive approach ostensibly allows for the emergence of different interpretations of the same legal situation.
Dworkin then argues that as an interpretive practice, law can,
and in fact does, give rise to substantively different theoretical positions.
Judicial decisions are political in the sense that judges will interpret
certain practices in light of their own normative or ideological
convictions. These differing versions of law are not relativistic in at least
two important senses. First, the interpretation will be constrained by the
requirement that it fits with the practice as a whole. Second, the search
for the best reading of a text demands that the interpreter take account
of the actual words and strive to make that text serve the coherence and
integrity of the object of interpretation. Interpreters cannot make of
texts whatever they want, but rather, must choose an interpretation
which in their view makes of the practice "the best that it can be."
This brief introduction to Dworkin's interpretive concept gives
us an idea of its project. Dworkin acknowledges the active role that
judges play in interpreting or creating the law, and then describes how
this act of interpretation is constrained in a manner which preserves and
enhances the integrity of the law. In this endeavour, Dworkin seeks a
middle ground between a strict positivist approach and the hopeless
relativism of legal realism. The question then becomes how does the law
simultaneously assist us in finding one best interpretation while
permitting the interplay of conflicting normative positions?
Dworkin addresses this problem in an empirical fashion by
tracing the stages of development in an interpretive community:

9

Ibid.

10 Ibid. at 52.
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We should first study a variety of activities in which people assume that they have good
reasons for what they say, which they assume hold generally and not just from one or
another individual point of view. We can then judge 11
what standards people accept in
practice for thining that they have reasons of that kind.

Dworkin thus argues backwards in time from the fact of the current
existence of an interpretive community to the presupposition of some
prior consensus upon which that community was able to develop. He
calls this initial stage the "preinterpretive" stage. This is the point at
which "the rules and standards taken to provide the tentative content of
the practice are identified. '12 It provides the interpreter with basic
assumptions which are necessary to determine what counts as part of the
practice. Dworkin concedes that the necessary level of prior agreement
may be quite high:
But a very great degree of consensus is needed-perhaps an interpretive community is
usefully defined as requiring consensus at this stage-if the interpretive attitude is to be
fruitful, and we may therefore abstract from this stage in our analysis by presupposing
that the classifications
it yields are treated as given in day-to-day reflection and
13
argument

Dworkin assumes that there must be some prior consensus about what
the law is before an interpretive community can develop. If we have an
interpretive community, then we must have agreed at some stage about
what the practice to be interpreted is about.
The preinterpretive stage is followed by the interpretive stage
wherein the interpreter settles on a general justification as to why the
practice is worth pursuing. This justification will vary according to the
interpreter's normative beliefs, but it must fit the practice well enough
that it does not demand a new practice; rather, it should seek to make
the current practice the best that it can be.
The third and final stage is a postinterpretive one which is
characterized by reform. It involves adjusting the requirements of a
practice according to the demands of the justification established at the
prior interpretive stage. The process is self-referential insofar as the
justification emerges out of a practice and in turn informs and constrains
the development of that same practice. In sum, Dworkin characterizes

11

"Law as Interpretation," supra, note 1 at 535.

12

Law's Empire,supra, note 1 at 65-66.

13 ibid. at 66.
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the law as an interpretive practice which is built on very general
agreement as to what that practice is about. Both empirical and
theoretical disagreement may then occur as part of that practice without
disrupting the institution as a whole.
III. FEMINISM WITHIN THE INTERPRETIVE COMMUNITY
What are the implications of Dworkin's thesis for feminism? At
first glance, he appears to accommodate feminist interests via the
acceptance of political opinions as a legitimate part of interpretation. By
writing politics into the script at a later point in the analysis, Dworkin
pre-empts numerous substantive objections to his prior theory of an
interpretive community. In this reading of Dworkin, feminism may be
viewed as a political theory which will inform any interpretation of the
law. As such, feminism will inevitably give rise to interpretations which
differ substantively from conservative or utilitarian versions of law. The
choice among these interpretations should then be determined
according to which interpretation makes of law the best that it can be.
In order for a feminist critique to fit into Dworkin's analysis in
this way, certain assumptions must be made about the character of that
critique. First, it must be assumed that feminists share the interpretive
attitude which requires that they view the practice of law as having value.
A corollary of this assumption would be that any feminist interpretation
must have a general justification as to why that practice is worth
pursuing. Second, it must be assumed that the feminist viewpoint is
included in the consensus at the preinterpretive stage. A third
assumption is that this feminist interpretation has a purpose which will
seek to show the practice of law in its best light. Finally, we must assume
that the resulting interpretation of the law will not be so controversial
that it disrupts the practice of law as it now stands.
A. The Systematic Oppression of Women
How well do these assumptions accord with feminist theories of
law? The task is to ascertain where our selected tenets of feminist
jurisprudence fit into Dworkin's scheme, if at all, and the kinds of
challenges they present for his thesis. Right from the outset, feminist
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claims regarding the law's systematic oppression of women present
problems for the inclusion of feminist politics in Dworkin's interpretive
community. Their claims appear to be a fundamental criticism of the
practice of law as a whole which may not accord with the proper
interpretive attitude as outlined by Dworkin. Specifically, it is debatable
whether a feminist who challenges the maleness of law may be said to be
presenting a general justification as to why the law is a practice worth
pursuing. Are feminist efforts in fact directed towards making of law the
best that it can be? Alternatively, is theirs a more revolutionary project
of replacing the existing legal edifice with something better?
Catharine MacKinnon's critique arguably does not leave much
room for justification of the law as an interpretive practice. An
important theme in her work is that a central underlying purpose of the
law is the oppression of women. Not only is the law instrumental in
reinforcing male values, it also has its own interest in perpetuating
discrimination on the basis of gender. If this is true, then feminism
departs from a Dworkinian analysis at the very first step. Feminist
theory does not assume that the law has value, nor does it try to justify
the law, but rather is in necessary and perpetual conflict with the
practice of law.
Dworkin characterizes this kind of revolutionary critique of the
law as "global internal scepticism." In the realm of courtesy, for
example, a global internal sceptic would conclude that "the practices of
courtesy, root and branch, serve no good purpose, or, even worse, that
they serve a malign one."1 4 Dworkin acknowledges that this view, if
true, threatens his own enterprise. His only response to the claim that
all conventional interpretations of law are morally wrong is that this
argument seems implausible. It seems that Dworkin cannot comprehend how any sceptic could actually conclude that law serves some
malign purpose such as the systematic oppression of women. Yet many
feminists do make that claim. This lack of understanding between the
two schools of thought suggests a fundamental rift not anticipated by
Dworkin. To the extent that such a rift exists, feminist jurisprudence
stands outside of Dworkin's theory of interpretive concepts and cannot
be included in his analysis at a later stage as a competing political
opinion.

14 Ibid. at 79.

1992]

FeministJurisprudence

A more moderate feminist position on this issue stops short of
concluding that the actual purpose of the law is the oppression of
women. These theorists instead confine themselves to observing the
ways in which the law in fact continues to discriminate against women in
a systematic fashion. This view leaves open the possibility that the
practice of law is retrievable or extricable from its historical role in
preserving patriarchy. As such, it more closely resembles an interpretation of law which seeks to make that practice the best that it can be.
Ann Scales builds her theory on many of MacKinnon's
observations of gender bias in the law, but she goes on to argue that the
practice of law should be rehabilitated rather than abandoned. To do so,
Scales presents a radically different conception of the law as a practice
which ought to promote societal values rather than attempt to develop a
discrete, abstract, immutable body of rules: "Law is, after all, a social
tool. It is only extrinsically important. Its actual value depends upon its
success in promoting that which is intrinsically valuable." 15 Scales argues
that the law has been diverted from this true purpose by a misguided
commitment to objectivity. She then concludes that feminism provides
the law with a much-needed theory of differentiation: "Feminism brings
law back to its purpose-to decide the moral crux of the matter in real
16
human situations."
It is interesting to note how well Dworkin's interpretive attitude
fits with the language used by Scales. She repeatedly refers to the
purpose of law and those factors which she regards as important to the
practice of law. One could view Scales' theory as an interpretation of the
law with its own particular justification for that practice. This
interpretation shares the interpretive attitude but diverges from
traditional jurisprudence in its radically different conception of law.
Dworkin anticipates such differences in his theory by acknowledging that
interpretation in law is essentially political and that "there will be
inevitable controversy, even among contemporaries, over the exact
dimensions of the practice they all interpret, and still more controversy
about the best justification of that practice." 17

15 "The Emergence of Feminist Jurisprudence," supra,note 5 at 1380.
16

Ibid.at 1387.

17 Law's Empire, supra,note 1 at 67.
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However, these parallels between Dworkin and Scales are
misleading, for it is doubtful that Scales herself would accept the place
accorded to feminism within Dworkin's interpretive community. Is this
feminist critique a political opinion within the interpretive community,
or does it stand outside of Dworkin's theory as a different kind of
jurisprudence? Dworkin does seem to capture some superficial sense of
the ways in which these critics or interpreters disagree about the law.
Our inquiry must then turn to the sorts of disagreements contemplated
by Dworkin, to see whether his theory can incorporate the disagreement
expressed in feminist jurisprudence. It will be argued here that the
interpretive community does not encompass those disagreements
because it is based on an assumption that feminists do not share-that is,
the assumed existence of some general agreement in society about the
nature of abstract concepts of law.
B. PreinterpretiveConsensus
The fact that consensus is a necessary precondition for the
existence of an interpretive community should effectively limit the kinds
of disagreement which might arise. That is, the assumption is that
feminist criticisms will not present a truly radical challenge to the law if
they are framed within a community based on consensus. Dworkin
acknowledges that there must be this kind of agreement at the
preinterpretive stage.
Is this consensus a reality for feminist legal theorists? Dworkin
might argue that it is, insofar as feminist and other legal theorists all
share some broad understanding as to what the law is-for example, he
holds that everybody agrees thatjustice is not a theory of art. It is indeed
hard to refute Dworkin's proposition at the most general level, but not
so impossible as one might think. To begin with, a feminist theory might
successfully argue that, by definition, the interpretive community
excludes the interests of women, because it is based on a notion of
consensus which is strictly male. In other words, Dworkin's assumption
of a consensus at some prior preinterpretive stage does not guarantee
that we have a true consensus now, because women have only recently
gained entry to the interpretive community of law. Dworkin states:
"For example, at a certain stage in the development of the practice,
everyone agrees that courtesy, described most abstractly, is a matter of
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respect. 18 Who "everyone" is makes a difference here, especially if it
excludes those who might have a different understanding of courtesy.
Ann Scales's understanding of what law is may well diverge in
important respects from just the sort of consensus that Dworkin
envisages. She regards the law in an instrumental fashion, as a practice
which does not have meaning in itself, but must instead justify its own
existence by serving concrete social goals. For Scales then, the law is
only a vehicle for politics, and the latter must take primacy over the
former. If this view of what the law is differs sufficiently from the basic
agreement necessary for an interpretive community to exist, then this
feminist theory presents a kind of disagreement which cannot be
incorporated into Dworkin's analysis. Even to the extent that there is de
facto agreement, feminists must reject the notion of some prior
consensus if that consensus did not actually include the views of women.
C. Concept and Conception
Dworkin defends his theory of preinterpretive consensus by
stressing that it only exists at the most general, abstract level. He argues
that this agreement is simply that which is necessary to ensure an
understanding, so that we are actually arguing about the same things.
He thus qualifies this requirement for consensus by noting that it is
uncontroversial; "[flor example, at a certain stage in the development of
the practice, everyone agrees that courtesy, described most abstractly, is
a matter of respect." 19 By this Dworkin means that this consensus
consists of agreement on the most general understanding of a concept,
such as the example of a generally agreed notion that courtesy is a
matter of respect. As such, respect is a concept of courtesy upon which
competing conceptions will develop as to how that concept is best served
or understood. We all agree on the general concepts, but we will
develop different conceptions of it according to our own interpretations.
In sum, this distinction between concept and conception serves to
account for disagreement within an interpretive community.
Feminist legal theorists are highly critical of analysis which relies
heavily on abstract generalizations. They are sceptical of the extent to
18 ibid. at 70.
19 Ibid.

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[voI.. 30 NO. 2

which such abstractions can ever give proper expression to women's
interests which tend to be concrete, particular, diverse and relational.
They call into question both the utility and accuracy of abstractioneither it is in danger of misrepresenting the realities on which it is based,
or it is simply incapable of providing any valuable information on the
phenomenon it seeks to describe.
Dworkin himself concedes that a concept may be so abstract that
its usefulness is limited, especially in attempts to pin down notions of
justice:
[Political philosophers] cannot develop semantic theories that provide rules for "justice"

like the rules we contemplated for "book." They can, however, try to capture the plateau
from which arguments about justice largely proceed, and try to describe this in some

abstract proposition taken to define the "concept" of justice for their community, so that
arguments over justice can be understood as arguments about the best conception of that
concept. Our own philosophers of justice rarely attempt this, for it is difficult to find a
statement of the concept at once sufficiently abstract to be uncontroversial among us and
sufficiently concrete to be useful. Our controversies0 about justice are too rich, and too
many different kinds of theories are now in the field?

This observation accords with feminist concerns to the extent that
Dworkin recognizes that abstract generalizations about the concept of
justice may be impossible because our controversies are too "rich."
However, he gets himself into potential difficulty insofar as the unifying
capabilities of such abstractions are lost in the recognition of controversy
surrounding them. If we cannot give expression to such concepts of law
because nobody agrees on what they are, then perhaps no such unified
concepts exist at all. One feminist position here might be that these
abstractions are in fact illusory because they are incapable of capturing
diversity. In other words, a concept like "courtesy" may not exist in any
true sense apart from the acts it encompasses where there is sufficiently
broad disagreement about what courtesy actually is. If so, feminists
would only recognize conceptions, and would do away with Dworkin's
concepts altogether.
In conclusion, Dworkin's concepts of law evince a reliance on
generalized abstraction as a means of transcending controversy about
terms like justice. He is reluctant to say that philosophers can describe a
concept of justice, because such description would effectively constrain
possibilities for disagreement. Instead, Dworkin uses the euphemism of

20 Ibid. at 74.
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"capturing a plateau" to avoid having to commit himself in this way. The
suggestion here is that Dworkin does in fact believe that philosophers
can intuit some actual meaning of the term "justice," even if they cannot
describe it. He thereby posits some agreement which operates as a kind
of universal standard upon which concepts may be judged. This stands
in direct opposition to the feminist argument that no such universal
criteria or concepts actually exist: "Abstract universality is ideology,
pure and simple ... Feminist analysis begins with the principle that
21
objective reality is a myth."

IV. OBJECTIVITY AND GENDER BIAS
One specific tenet of feminist jurisprudence which is particularly
relevant to Dworkin's theory is the idea that the systematic oppression of
women is perpetuated by a characterization of legal rules as objective or
neutral. This argument focuses on the utility of objective standards in
disguising the inherently political or ideological content of the law. Such
value-laden law is difficult to challenge on normative grounds because it
is not aware of its own perspective. Ann Scales calls this "the tyranny of
objectivity. '22 The result is a supposedly neutral law which in fact
embodies a covert male ethos. In this context, objectivity is rejected by
feminists because it is a chimeric and dangerously misleading concept,
making gender bias in law notoriously difficult to identify and expose.
This critique of objectivity is pertinent to Dworkin's theory of
interpretive concepts to the extent that these concepts are founded on
some objective criteria for selection among competing interpretations.
Dworkin himself denies that his theory of interpretive concepts is
objective in that interpretations cannot be demonstrated to be true or
false. Instead, Dworkin describes his own theory as subjective because it
depends on the interpreter's choice of interpretation. He stresses,
however, that the attitude taken by the interpreters themselves seems to
be more objective: "[Interpreters] think the interpretations they adopt
are better than, not merely different from, those they reject." 23 Dworkin
carefully avoids asserting that there is one right answer-that one
21 "The Emergence of Feminist Jurisprudence," supra, note 5 at 1378.
22 Ibid. at 1376.
23 Law's Empire,supra, note 1 at 76.
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interpretation may be said to be objectively better than another. He
tries to leave the question open, allowing for the mere possibility of an
objective truth, which should be sufficient for the interpreter's purpose:
Objectivity is another matter. It is an open question, I think, whether the main judgments
we make about art can properly be said to be true or false, valid or invalid ... Of course,
no important aesthetic claim can be "demonstrated" to be true or false ... but it does not
follow that no normative theory about art is better
2 4 than any other, nor that one theory
cannot be the best that has so far been produced.

By implication, Dworkin's position is a pragmatic acceptance of the
possibility of one right answer in the absence of evidence to the contrary.
At the same time, he avoids the conclusion that this is an objective
standard. Dworkin would seem to prefer to leave the debate over
objectivity behind:
There is no obvious reason in the account I gave of legal interpretation to doubt that one
interpretation of law can be better than another and that one can be best of all ... we
would do well, in considering these general issues, not to begin with any fixed ideas about
the necessary or sufficient conditions of objectivity ... In the meantime, we can sensibly
aim to develop various levels of a conception of law for ourselves, to find the
interpretation of a complex and dramatically important practice which seems to us at
once the right kind of interpretation for law and right as that kind of interpretation. 25

V. OBJECTIVE CONSTRAINTS ON FEMINIST DISAGREEMENT
In this rather tortuous approach to objectivity, Dworkin leaves
the door open for reliance on objective standards within his interpretive
community. As such, his theory is susceptible to feminist arguments
about the specious quality of these objective criteria. Conversely, the
interpretive community will not be able to accommodate feminist
challenges to the law if that community has its own political agenda
which is not compatible with feminist concerns. Dworkin's interpretive
practice may effectively constrain disagreement and exert an ideological
hegemony through its requirement of fit and the homogenizing purpose
of making law the best that it can be.
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A. The Requirementof Fit
Dworkin's theory of interpretive concepts imposes an important
constraint on the interpreter; that is, the requirement that an
interpretation fits with the prior law to some extent. "A judge's duty is
to interpret the legal history he finds, not to invent a better history. The
dimension of fit will provide some boundaries." 26 In other words, the
interpreter is not completely free to construct any interpretation of that
practice; "[h]e must interpret what has gone before because he has a
responsibility to advance the enterprise in hand rather than strike out in
some new direction of his own." 27 In this way, the history or previous
practice of law exerts an independent influence on any interpretation of
that practice.
Fit thus emerges as a second kind of conviction (following the
preinterpretive consensus) which is necessary to the interpretive
attitude. This conviction about the necessity of fit may vary somewhat
between interpreters, but this variation must not be too great, and such
convictions must stand independently from the interpreter's political
opinions. They are formal constraints vis-ii-vis substantive views of what
the law should be:
But we have already seen ... two different dimensions along which any interpretation can

be tested: the "formal" dimension, which asks how far the interpretation fits and
integrates the text so far completed, and the "substantive" dimension, which considers
the soundness of the view about what makes a novel good on which the interpretation
relies. 8

Do feminists have such a conviction that their theories of law must fit
the current practice well enough that it provides a justification for it?
Our prior discussion of feminism as a theory of the systematic
oppression of women suggests that this is not the case. Scales seems
quite prepared to abandon the practice of law if it fails to meet social
goals, as evidenced in her instrumental view of law as being "only
extrinsically important." A more important feminist objection to the
notion of fit arises in the context of our current discussion of objectivity.
The problem here is that fit, as informed by notions of integrity or
26 ibid. at 544.
27

TIid. at 543.

28 Ibid. at 541 n. 6.
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coherence, effectively operates as an objective criterion for what sort of
interpretation is best. It thus elevates history to a normative status as
something to be valued in itself.
There is no clear reason why feminists should accept this
assertion of the primafacie value of historical consistency, and feminist
legal theorists may in fact have good reason for seeking to disrupt that
tradition. If gender bias is well entrenched in the body of the common
law, then a feminist theory must by definition seek to displace the status
quo to some extent. Marsha Hanen discusses this element of Dworkin's
theory in her article on "Feminism, Objectivity and Legal Truth":
But even if we grant the "right answer" thesis, the question that leaps to mind is whether
these existing conceptions of settled law and political morality are as they should be. To
the extent that they are not, Dworkin's right answer may well be a morally incorrect one.
The emphasis on history, on entrenchment in the legal system, is thus troubling, not least
because the law has not historically always treated women and minorities the way we
would wish. Dworkin, of course, thinks that he can give arguments within the legal
system for the morally correct outcomes, but whether he is right about this is at least
controversial 2 9

On the basis of the foregoing analysis, the Dworkinian requirement of fit
must be rejected by feminist legal theorists because it stands as an
example of a supposedly neutral criterion which does not comprehend
its own perspectivity-namely, the gender-biased perspective which is
inherent in the status quo. Once again, feminist jurisprudence departs
from a Dworkinian analysis on the basis of differing assumptions-here,
regarding the relative value of consistency in the current practice of law.
B. The Best That It Can Be
Disagreement over the utility of a requirement of fit illuminates
a central point of departure from a Dworkinian analysis in feminist
jurisprudence-their differing conceptions of the purpose of making the
practice of law the best that it can be. Earlier, it was asserted that Scales
seeks to justify the practice of law according to her own normative
judgments about what social goals the law ought to pursue. However, a
review of the assumptions which must buttress an interpretive attitude in
29
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Dworkin's scheme demonstrated a fundamental difference; feminist
jurisprudence falls outside the purview of the interpretive community
insofar as it rejects the assumption of any unifying concepts or general
agreement. The result is an attempt to make law the best that it can be
which is unconstrained by shared preinterpretive boundaries or a
commitment to the requirement of fit.
In the end, Dworkin's efforts to allow some latitude in
interpretation are undermined by the restrictions he imposes on the
scope of permissible disagreements. He thus arrives at a point where
there is a "right answer"; one single interpretation will emerge as the
best in terms of its fit with the practice of law as a whole. The purpose
of making the law the best that it can be thus ceases to be open-ended,
and instead operates as an objective standard upon which to judge
competing conceptions.
We have yet to establish where feminist theories are situated on
the continuum between objectivity and relativism, but it is clear that
there is a general mistrust of assertions of objectivity in the law. This
mistrust is apparent in Scales' comment that "the narcotic influence
which objectivity has increasingly exerted over our minds makes us ever
less alert to the mythic structure around us." 30 Following from this is a
large degree of scepticism as to whether there can ever be one right
answer or one best interpretation. As Hanen observes, this scepticism is
both plausible and appealing.
C. External Scepticism
Dworkin labels this charge that there is in fact no single right
answer "external scepticism." He characterizes it as a metaphysical
argument about "the philosophical standing or classification" of truth
claims. The external sceptic insists that any such claims "are not
descriptions that can be proved or tested like physics." 31 Dworkin
refutes this criticism by arguing that his own theory does not claim to be
provable in any scientific manner. Interpretive claims should be understood as moral rather than metaphysical claims, and their objective cast
is intended only to qualify the kind of belief held:
30 "The Emergence of Feminist Jurisprudence," supra, note 5 at 1379.
31
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We use the language of objectivity, not to give our ordinary moral or interpretive claims a
bizarre metaphysical base, but to repeat them, perhaps in a more precise way, to
emphasize or qualify their content ... We also use the language of objectivity to
distinguish between claims meant to hold only for persons with particular beliefs or
connections or needs or interests (perhaps only for the speaker) and those meant to hold
impersonally for everyone. 32

Dworkin then argues that the external sceptic's critique is misplaced
because it attacks claims that the interpreter does not make;
furthermore, that critique is dishonest insofar as it relies on the weight of
metaphysical arguments to attack what are essentially moral claims.
The feminist critique of objectivity stands, however, vis-a-vis
Dworkin's theory. A feminist assertion that there are no right answers
does not confine itself to claims which must be proven to be true; it also
addresses those moral assertions which do not claim scientific status but
are simply meant to hold impersonally for everyone. In other words, it
does not matter that Dworkin's interpreters themselves do not view their
claims as enjoying some metaphysical status. The very fact that they lay
claim to the universality of their moral views is in itself sufficient to grant
them this metaphysical status. The distinction between moral and
metaphysical breaks down as soon as a moral claim transcends the view
of the subject, being elevated to the metalevel status of being true for
everyone.
Leaving aside the question of whether feminism has its own
transcendent moral agenda, it is possible to conclude that the external
scepticism articulated in feminist legal theory presents problems for the
use of interpretive concepts. This does not mean that feminist
jurisprudence is therefore more defensible or plausible than a
Dworkinian analysis. The point to be made is simply that there is a
genuine disagreement here which is not contemplated within the
interpretive community. Dworkin's theory thus fails to recognize the
validity of the contention that there may not be any right answers.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
From the foregoing discussion, we may conclude that feminist
jurisprudence departs from Dworkin's theory of interpretive concepts at
a very early stage in the analysis. These two perspectives offer radically
32ibid. at 81.
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different accounts of the place of law in society; Dworkin is involved in
the traditional endeavour of justifying the existing practice of law, while
feminists are busy trying to replace it with something new. This accounts
for the inability of Dworkin's theory to accommodate a controversy
concerning the legitimacy of the interpretive community itself and the
practice of law as a whole. In his efforts to incorporate political
opinions, Dworkin repeatedly underestimates the extent of that
disagreement.
The kind of analysis which Dworkin presents is also threatening
to feminist jurisprudence in precisely the manner anticipated in our
discussion of objectivity in the law. By subjecting political opinions to
the objective or external requirement of fit, Dworkin actually imposes a
political agenda upon the interpreter. He allows that the status quo may
be challenged from within by new interpretations, but fails to recognize
the operant power dynamics which militate against such change. These
new interpreters face the nearly impossible task of persuading the
existing legal edifice that it ought to change, while they are confined to
the tools of language, logic and argument developed within the practice
of law for the purpose of justifying its existence. Not surprisingly, then,
some feminists have instead chosen to step outside of the interpretive
community. Such constraints have necessitated a departure from
Dworkin's standard criteria of integrity, coherence and consistency at
every turn, so that feminist jurisprudence starts to look like it is not
about the law at all.

